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Environmental Impact Statements and Public Participation in 
International Investment Law 
 
 
 
by David Collins* 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
Environmental impact statements are institutionalized decision processes relating to 
the environmental effects from large scale projects.  Foreign direct investment 
activities, characterized by the foreign management and control of a commercial 
enterprise taking place in another state, often raise environmental concerns, especially 
where investment projects take place in developing states.  An important method of 
ensuring that the negative effects of such investment activities do not harm the host 
state and its citizens is to seek input from the local communities.  Public participation 
in governmental decision-making relating to the environment (as with other areas) is 
seen as enshrining state action with legitimacy.  It also fulfils the right to participate in 
the democratic process, which has been linked to human rights generally.1  
Additionally and perhaps obviously, involvement of non-state actors such as citizen 
groups and NGOs may uncover information that had been missed by the decision-
making body.   
Foster and Epps have observed the need for public participation in the 
management of health related risks in the sphere of international trade law because of 
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the role of subjectivity in the perception of risks.2  Similarly, community attitudes 
towards a particular investment project may reflect willingness to tolerate greater 
risks, or equally a stronger aversion to them than may be indicated by more empirical 
assessments of danger.  This possibility is demonstrated by the World Trade 
Organization’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, which defers to 
national approach to risk when setting health standards.  Accordingly, Craik notes that 
most domestic environmental impact assessments include some form of public 
participation.3  Unfortunately this trend is not duplicated in the sphere of international 
investment law where the environmental effects of commercial activities can be 
particularly acute, as in the extractive industries, and local citizen’s interests strongly 
affected in a much more intrusive manner.  Unlike trade which merely concerns with 
the importation of foreign goods, foreign direct investment involves the physical 
presence of foreign infrastructure in the local territory.  Exacerbating this problem is 
the theory that multinational enterprises are attracted to regions where environmental 
regulations are lax because lower standards represent a significant cost reduction.4  
 The need for greater public participation in international investment law must 
be viewed in light of the characterization of international investment law as a sphere 
of public law, rooted in the interaction of states through commitments made in 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (‘BIT’s).5  Kentin charges that those individuals which 
                                               
2
 C.E. Foster, ‘Public Opinion and the Interpretation of the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures’ 11 JIEL 427; T Epps, ‘Reconciling Public Opinion and WTO 
Rules Under the SPS Agreement’ 7:2 World Trade Review (2008) at 359 
3
 N Craik, International Law of Environmental Impact Statements (Cambridge U Press, 2008) at 31.  
For example the EU Directive on Environmental Impact Assessment 2003/35/EC Art 3 
4
 This theory has been challenged by many:  E.g. A Harrison, “Do Polluters Head Overseas:  Testing 
the Pollution Haven Hypothesis” Gianni Foundation of Agricultural Economics, UC Davis, 2002;  J.M. 
Grether, “Globalization and Dirty Industries:  Do Pollution Havens Matter?” CEPR Discussion Paper 
No. 932, June 2003; WTO, Trade and Environment 1-8 (Special Study No. 4 1999); A Abinmanyu 
“Impact of Free Trade on Industrial Pollution: Do Pollution Havens Exist?” ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996. 
5
 See generally M Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign Investment, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 
2004) and D Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalization, (Cambridge, 2008) 
 3 
may be most affected in their immediate environment by foreign investment projects 
are often neglected in international investment regulation, for example in investment 
treaties.  Negotiation of the rules governing foreign investment typically takes place 
on a federal or national level and it is purely dependant on host country policies as to 
whether local stakeholders are involved at all.  Very often this is not the case as 
placing environmental obligations on investors may act as a deterrent to foreign 
investment, which as suggested above may have chosen a particular jurisdiction 
because of its weaker regulatory regime.6 
 More lenient regulatory requirements in developing states have led to what 
may be described as the three-state problem of international investment law.7  In 2008 
foreign direct investment outflows from the developing world were at $253 billion 
and emerging economies; such as the BRIC states (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
contributed a significant portion of this figure.  Such investments are increasingly 
channelled to projects in the developing world because of the natural resource 
endowments and lower costs of these regions (so-called south-south investment).8   
Facing regulatory competition with each other, states in the developing world seek to 
attract further investment by lowering standards, such as those associated with 
environmental protection.  Foreign investors, increasingly from emerging economies 
will, in theory, seize upon this to pollute.  In the interest of safeguarding the global 
environment, the more ecologically conscious states of the developed world attempt 
to impose their more stringent standards on these transactions.  As we shall see, to a 
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degree this is reflected in some the investment credit finance policies and, to a lesser 
extent, various BITs.  Further regulation in this area is warranted. 
This article will begin by illustrating existing international treaties that provide 
for public participation in environmental assessment procedures.  Part Three will 
consider environmental assessment procedures implemented by the World Bank as a 
condition of its financing of investment projects.  Part Four will look briefly at these 
requirements as instigated by two of the key regional development banks.  
Environmental assessment requirements of private sector financiers will not be 
examined in detail.9 Parts Five and Six will consider environmental assessment 
initiatives relating to international investment originating from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law.  Part Seven will explore the extent to which public 
participation in environmental assessment is reflected in BITs and Part 8 will suggest 
how BITs could advance a mandatory public component of environmental assessment 
in foreign direct investment without violating National Treatment principles.   
 
 
II.  Public Participation in International Environmental Law 
A right of participation in decision-making relating to environmental matters was 
enshrined in the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the Aarhus 
Convention).10   The Convention provides that signatory states must take all necessary 
legislative, regulatory and judicial steps to ensure that the public is able to exercise its 
right to public participation in environmental decision-making. Citizens have the right 
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to readily-accessible information regarding environmental decisions. The public 
should be made aware of the nature of the activity and its potential environmental 
impacts and be given a reasonable opportunity to engage in effective participation in 
the decision-making process, which involves timely notifications of meetings and the 
right to submit comments.  Parties are required to take the results of the public 
participation into account as far as possible.  Since it entered into force in 2001, the 
Aarhus Convention has been ratified by only 40 states.  The United States and Russia, 
two leading sources and targets of investment, are not signatories.  While 
commentators have noted that Aarhus implies regulatory constraints in relation to 
investment,11 this highly-celebrated, human rights-based approach to public 
participation in environmental matters appears to have had little influence on the 
standards of public participation observed in international investment law.  
 The second major international instrument establishing a role for public 
participation in environmental matters is the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development12 produced in 1992 by the United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development.  Principle 10 of the Declaration states that environmental issues are 
best handled through participation of all parties that may be concerned, which 
requires access to information and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes.  Principle 17 of the Declaration, which requires environmental impact 
assessments, is seen as one of the primary mechanisms by which Principle 10 can be 
achieved.13 While influential, this document offers less than the Aarhus Convention, 
as its principles are typically viewed in international law as providing guidance rather 
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than binding commitments.14  Unfortunately this also appears to be the case for most 
of the terms of investment credit agencies, as we shall see below. 
 While few instances of foreign direct investment would be of sufficient 
magnitude to affect areas beyond the local environment, the Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (the Espoo 
Convention) could be relevant for investments resulting in transboundary 
environmental harms, such as those emitting high levels of airborne pollution.  This 
Convention, which was adopted in 1991, requires that environmental impact 
assessments be conducted by states which may have caused pollution that crosses 
international borders.  The treaty also contains extensive provisions for public 
participation.15  Again, while the relevance of this instrument is limited for the 
purpose of regulating foreign investment activities, Espoo is seen to embody a 
continuing trend towards transnationalism in environmental law.16 This ideology 
underpins the need to establish rules at the national level of host states for limiting 
environmental damage in international investment law.   
 Lastly, the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities17 requires that state parties 
provide any states likely to be affected by an environmentally hazardous activity with 
relevant information regarding the risk involved and the harm which might result, 
however it there is no requirement that it be provided to affected citizens themselves, 
ignoring the obvious disjunction between a government and its people.18  The 
obligation to inform affected citizens would presumably fall on the relevant state itself 
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as a feature of its domestic law, rather than an as consequence of its international 
treaty commitments.  Still, Foster urges that this ICL instrument is indicative of the 
important role of subjectivity in the management of risk, especially the treaty’s 
concept of disseminating information in an “appropriate” manner, which is viewed as 
a preferably alternative to the logic of cost benefit analysis.19 Subjectivity in risk 
assessment necessitates some form of stakeholder participation in advance of the 
establishment of a potentially environmentally hazardous project. 
 In light of the above, the International Court of Justice recently stated that 
environmental impact assessment has gained so much acceptance in international law 
that it may now be seen as a requirement under general international law in situations 
where an activity may have an adverse environmental effect that crosses borders.  
International investment activities may fit this model in the sense that the polluting 
investor has a legal connection to a jurisdiction other than that in which it is operating 
and causing harm. Interestingly, the ICJ was unwilling to find an obligation on the 
part of a state to consult with affected parties, despite the recognized emphasis on 
public consultation in international treaty law.20  It is noteworthy that an ICSID 
tribunal also declared that environmental impact assessment was increasingly viewed 
as a component of international law.21 
 From the above it is evident that there is precedent in international treaty law 
for public participation in the assessment of environmental risks.  While it would be 
difficult to claim that public participation in environmental impact assessment should 
be viewed as a normative principle in international law because of the limited 
adoption of these treaties as well as inconsistent state practice (as we shall see below), 
this process could be seen as lex ferenda and as such should apply to the investment 
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activities of multinationals operating in developing states. Indeed as we shall now see, 
international development bank guidelines have contemplated public participation in 
environmental assessment for the investment projects they fund.  Such projects are 
financed through development agencies because they are intended to benefit the 
developing world, where environmental risks are arguably the most acute due to more 
vulnerable communities and weaker governance. Development banks extending 
finance credit for investments have been praised for their unusually high level of 
engagement with non-state actors in environmental decision-making.22  As observed 
cogently by Sands,23 the central issue with these organizations is the extent to which 
investment credit is made available to projects which may be environmentally 
harmful and what mechanisms are available to identify and cope with such risks. 
 
III.   The World Bank Group 
The most important of the development banks is the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, better known as the World Bank Group, which is 
an international institution that provides leveraged loans for poorer countries for 
programs aimed at poverty reduction.  Its role in investment in developing states is 
important in that it both provides insurance for private foreign investors operating 
within these regions as well as capital for private investors located in the states 
themselves.  The World Bank was among the first financiers to introduce 
environmental impact assessment and public consultation procedures in project 
financing.24  Environmental assessment procedures for the World Bank Group’s most 
significant institutions will now be considered. 
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i) Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (‘MIGA’)’s Environmental Assessment 
Policy 
MIGA is a branch of the World Bank Group which provides financial insurance 
against non-commercial risks that could affect investments in developing states.   It 
also provides technical assistance to improve investment opportunities in these 
countries as well as a dispute mediation service.   It is particularly concerned with 
providing insurance for infrastructure related projects.  Such insurance is required 
because of the often highly volatile political regimes and lack of a sound legal 
framework for redress of grievances in these countries.  MIGA has issued more than 
US$21 billion in guarantees to investors since its inception in 198825.  The 
investments which it supports must meet various requirements, one of which is its 
environmental assessment of investment projects. 
MIGA’s Environmental Assessment Policy forms part of Annex B of the 
agency’s Operational Regulations26.  The policy requires that all projects which 
receive MIGA funding (guarantees) must engage in an environmental assessment, the 
precise scope of which will depend on the “nature, scale and environmental impact of 
the proposed project.”27  Project applicants are required to prepare their own 
assessments, unless they are a minority partner in the project.   The assessment takes 
into account “variations in project and country conditions” and the host country’s 
“overall policy framework and national legislation.”28 When reviewing the 
environmental assessment as submitted, MIGA may require public consultation and 
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disclosure.29  Public consultation and disclosure is required for all Category A (the 
most environmentally risky) projects as a component of the environmental 
assessment.  Contact with locally affected groups, including non-governmental 
organizations, should be initiated as soon as possible after the guarantee is sought.30  
Such consultations must be “meaningful” and as such MIGA requires that any 
information transmitted to the public must be done in a timely manner and in a 
language that is understood.31 
 
ii)  International Finance Corporation (‘IFC’)’s Environmental and Social Review 
Procedures 
The IFC is also part of the World Bank Group and its purpose is to foster sustainable 
economic growth in developing states by financing private sector loans for specific 
projects such as highways, dams, factories and other large scale activities that may 
have ecological impacts.  Generally the IFC helps private companies located in 
emerging economies acquire capital and improve their governance.   Unlike MIGA it 
is not an insurance scheme against risk in unstable countries, but rather a source of 
financing that might be unavailable in the normal commercial sphere because of the 
perceived risk inherent in companies located in the developing world.   
 Encouragingly, the IFC imposes environmental assessment standards on the 
projects which it funds.  This is done through its Environmental and Social Review 
Procedures (‘EFSR’)32. The IFC’s EFSR apply to the full range of investment 
activities that the agency supports:  direct lending to private corporations, lending to 
intermediaries, as well as structured finance products such as guarantees and 
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securitizations.33   Unlike the MIGA’s environmental requirements, the IFC’s 
procedures are framed in such a way that they validate various stages of an investment 
project – rather than simply the concluding stage.  It appears as though the procedures 
help achieve compliance with IFC guidelines, rather than strictly speaking acting as a 
screen against projects that are not sufficiently environmentally sound.  The IFC 
typically intervenes after a project is conceived, and often after a site is chosen, but 
early enough so its modifications are not overly burdensome.34  This approach is 
reflected in the use of the word “client” rather than “applicant” – to a degree the IFC 
is intent on treating its users as the functional commercial entities that they aspire to 
be.   
The IFC’s policy regarding environmental assessment is well detailed, with a 
specific time line and individualized roles for all parties concerned.   A key 
component of the IFC’s Review Procedures is Stakeholder Identification and 
Analysis, which involves the assessment of the environmental impact of the project 
on local households and communities.  This process should involve some form of 
public consultation, although the precise method of achieving this is not specified, 
other than the fact that it should be “free”, (which means at no cost to the public 
participants and was not coerced), and that it be “informed”, (which means that it 
must be presented in understandable language).35  In addition to consultations, the IFC 
identifies a need to achieve Broad Community Support for the project which is 
defined as “a collective expression by the affected communities, through individuals 
and/or their recognized representatives, in support of the project. There may be broad 
community support even if some individuals or groups object to the project.”36  The 
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affected communities are a subset of a broader group of project stakeholders located 
within the project’s area of influence, in the region, host country, or elsewhere.37   
Public consultation and broad community support will be required as condition of 
financing only in situations where there is a significant adverse impact on an affected 
community or if indigenous people are involved.38  In order to assess whether such 
consultation has occurred, the IFC will consider whether affected communities have 
been engaged in identifying potential environmental impacts and assessing the 
consequences of these impacts on their lives.  The IFC will also examine whether the 
affected communities have provided input into proposed mitigation measures.  The 
extent to which impacts have been fully disclosed to affected groups, such as the 
nature and scale of the project, is of key importance, as is the requirement that such 
consultations be “understandable and meaningful.”  Again, this may mean that the 
responses elicited are not coerced through threat or reward and that they are delivered 
in an understandable language – or perhaps orally.  Evidence that good faith 
consultations with the public have occurred will include one-to-one interviews and 
documentation of agreements with leaders of communities or households, as well as 
records of contact with vulnerable groups.40 
The need for public consultation is further seen in the IFC’s preparation of an 
Environmental and Social Review Summary, a publicly available document which is 
intended to be understood by members of the local community.  This document will 
identify how a project was reviewed and the rationale for IFC deciding to invest.  It 
includes a description of the main social and environmental risks and impacts of the 
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project, as well as the key measures identified to mitigate those risks and impacts.41  
Various other documents produced throughout the process are made available to the 
public.  The Review Procedures state that the “IFC will also take into account the 
project context including the development benefits of the investment project as well 
as public policy and the local, regional and national political considerations.”42 Public 
participation is evidently an important component of environmental assessment for 
IFC and this should be viewed as a major achievement in the sphere of investment 
law and environmental law generally. 
It should be noted further that in 2004 The IFC implemented the Extractive 
Industries Review, a series of assessments conducted around the world which 
acknowledged the extensive role that the World Bank plays in supporting extractive 
industries in the developing world and the potential damaging effect such projects can 
have.  The report concluded that while the IFC would continue to provide financial 
assistance to extractive projects, the IFC must improve the clarity, accessibility and 
implementation of its environmental assessments required in relation to these 
activities.  A key feature of these modifications is increased community participation 
in relation to support for extractive industry projects.43  The review also, somewhat 
vaguely, states the need for “increased efforts on project appraisal, consultation, 
disclosure, and value added projects”.44   
 Although it is outside the focus of this article to consider private financing for 
investment projects, it should be mentioned that the IFC played a large part in the 
promulgation of the Equator Principles, developed also by NGOs such as the World 
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Wildlife Fund and the Friends of the Earth, as well as private banks.45  Finalized in 
June 2003 and revised in July 2006 the Equator Principles are standards by which 
social and environmental impacts in private project financing are assessed.46  The 
more than 50 financial institutions that are signatories to the principles promise to 
provide loans only to borrowers who conform to the principles.  Principle 5 states that 
borrowers must have consulted with “affected local communities in a structured and 
culturally appropriate manner.” Moreover, a strategic environmental assessment 
report must be made publicly available in a local language for a reasonable period to 
allow for public comment, and there must be a grievance procedure regarding any 
social environmental concerns arising from the project.47  While a more detailed 
examination of private sector guidelines is beyond the scope of this article, it should 
be noted that Richardson has lamented that many private sector financiers can escape 
their Equator commitments by acting indirectly through financial intermediaries and 
that in practice banks rarely enforce Equator covenants in loan agreements.48   
 
 
iii) The World Bank Inspection Panel 
Lastly some mention should be made of the World Bank Inspection Panel, which is an 
internal dispute settlement body established to consider whether the process leading to 
a possible contract between the bank and a borrower follows the bank’s operational 
policies for environmental assessment with project-affected groups, as noted above.  
Affected groups of persons may submit a complaint for failure of the bank (not of the 
borrower itself) to comply with its own policies concerning financing an investment 
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project.49  The Inspection Panel process is a second layer of assessment which 
incorporates public participation that is built into the pre-establishment evaluation of 
the environmental impact of the investment project.  It should be noted that this 
process has been criticized for being of an administrative nature only rather than a 
more open, transparent feature of public international law.50 
 
 
IV.    Regional Development Banks 
In addition to the World Bank Group’s efforts to foster investments in development- 
related projects, there are a number of regional development banks which have the 
same purpose and which have identified environmental assessment as a key condition 
for financing.    
 
i) The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (‘EBRD’) 
The EBRD provides project financing for banks, industries and businesses from 
Europe to Central Asia.  The EBRD’s 2008 Environmental and Social Policy and 
Performance Requirements51 outline the environmental standards applicable to each 
investment and describe the way in which each project will be appraised and 
monitored.  All EBRD-financed projects undergo environmental appraisal which is 
integrated into the EBRD’s overall project appraisal, including the assessment of 
financial risks. The extent of the appraisal will be linked to the nature and scale of the 
project, and commensurate with the level of environmental impacts.  It is the 
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responsibility of the client to ensure that the required due diligence studies, 
information disclosure and stakeholder engagement are carried out in accordance with 
the EBRD’s performance requirements, and submitted to the EBRD for review as part 
of its own appraisal.52  The EBRD also requires meaningful consultations with 
stakeholders and in some circumstances may engage in its own such consultations.53   
 
ii) Asian Development Bank (‘ADB’) 
The ADB extends loans to developing country members for development related 
projects and also facilitates public and private investment for development projects.  
Established in 1966, the bank is based in Manila and composed of 67 Member 
countries, including 44 developing countries from the region.  The Public 
Consultation Policy of the ADB requires that the ADB itself must proactively share 
information and seek feedback from stakeholders as well as respond to information 
requests.54 This is reflected in the ADB’s Environmental Assessment Guidelines 
which contains exhaustive requirements for reporting on the environmental impacts of 
the development projects which have received funding.  In particular, environmental 
impact reports must describe how the public has been involved in the assessment of 
the environmental effects of the project and include summaries of comments received 
from community leaders as well as samples of materials used to augment public 
awareness, such as press releases.55 It should be noted, however, that while the an 
assessment of the impact of an investment project on indigenous peoples is required 
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by the Asian Development Bank, there is no requirement of these peoples’ free and 
informed consent to the investment project.56   
 
V.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) 
The OECD is a forum of 30 developed states which creates policy regarding 
economic and social issues and contributes to developing policy that may advance the 
interests of non-member states (developing countries).  It maintains several policies 
relating to environmental assessment in foreign investment. 
 
i) OECD Report on Environmental Compliance 
Its report on Ensuring Environmental Compliance:  Trends and Good Practices57 was 
created through a comparison of environmental assessment methodology of several 
Member states, as such it is seen as a policy framework for environmental assessment 
that could be of use to many states.  Generally it identifies good practices and 
compliance monitoring in the context of various regulatory cultures and outlines 
trends which have emerged across different systems with respect to environmental 
assessment.     
 The document outlines the main elements of a compliance assurance system 
for environmental standards.  Although the document is not specifically aimed at 
compliance in the context of foreign direct investment, investment issues are clearly 
contemplated.  One of this policy’s aims is to create a predictable investment climate 
based on the rule of law, thereby stimulating economic development and innovation 
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and enhancing markets for environmental goods and services.58  It refers extensively 
to the need for host states to offer financial incentives such as tax relief and subsidies 
for investing companies to exceed environmental standards when engaging in foreign 
direct investment.   Generally this document offers useful guidance on environmental 
assessment generally.   
 Much of the recommendations in this document are lacking in clarity.  One of 
the key policies identified from this document is the need to increase stakeholder 
participation through enhanced transparency and consultation.  It notes major 
advancements in the dissemination of environmental impact information to the public 
in the Netherlands and in the U.S.59 The main aspects of this augmented openness 
include transparency of the permit process, disclosure of compliance monitoring and 
enforcement information, and performance accountability of the government agencies 
themselves that are involved.60  Such practices may also be necessary to adhere with 
the Fair and Equitable Treatment Principle seen in many investment treaties.61  The 
report observes that citizen groups play a major role in shaping and implementing 
environmental enforcement in a number of the studied states.  This is not consultation 
in the sense of a mandatory stage in the approval of a project, but rather proactive 
collection and publication of data by citizens on environmental quality and 
compliance.62  Such information could be extremely helpful to regulatory bodies 
when assessing the more subjective component of environmental risks. 
 The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee instigates the concept of 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (‘SEA’) through its Good Practice Guidance for 
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Development Co-operation63 which was developed in response to continued requests 
for guidance on how to implement environmental assessment in conjunction with 
development aid.  Although designed for the purpose of extending development aid to 
developing states, this document addresses the potential utility of SEA to attract 
foreign direct investment for the purpose of public infrastructure.64   While developed 
in the context of donor-based aid, typically from development agencies, this 
document can be used to evaluate profit-motivated capital injections from the private 
sector.  The rationale for integrating SEA with an investment project is that this 
process identifies how the projects are affected by external factors, which involves 
recording any existing environmental issues.  This will allow potential cumulative 
impacts to be identified such that the technologies that are being used can be 
optimized.  The SEA methodology facilitates the planning of infrastructure projects to 
be integrated with environmental planning at an early stage through a participatory 
process.  This will allow “stakeholders at all levels” (not identified further) to 
consider the project and discuss environmental (as well as social and cultural) needs 
and constraints.65  Failure to use SEA is often depicted as carrying important financial 
costs, rather than exclusively environmental ones; for example the guide notes that 
costs involved “might consist of unbudgeted time and resources in handling disputes 
with local communities or mitigation of avoidable harm through pollution. In extreme 
cases, it may be necessary to relocate or redesign facilities.”66 
 
ii)  OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations 
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The OECD Guidelines on Multinational Corporations67 attempts to encourage 
positive contributions that multinational enterprises can make to economic and social 
progress as well as minimize any problems that their activities can cause through their 
operations, particularly in host states that lack comprehensive regulatory standards or 
the capacity to enforce.  One of the central policies in the guidelines is that 
multinational corporations must contribute to economic progress with a view to 
achieving sustainable development.68 Although the guidelines are not binding, they 
should be viewed as instructive and numerous scholars, notably Muchlinski, have 
advocated that they inform treaty obligations of home and host states in matters 
relating to foreign direct investment.69   
 The Guidelines contemplate environmental assessment as a component of 
corporate responsibility.  This involves the maintaining of a system of environmental 
management through the collection of information regarding environmental impacts 
and regular monitoring.70  The Guidelines further recommend that corporations 
engaging in international investment should engage in high quality levels of 
disclosure relating to the effects of their activities.  This includes reporting of 
environmental issues where they exist.71  In particular, public consultations should 
encompass the provision to the public (as well as the multinational’s employees) with 
adequate and timely information on the potential environmental impacts of the 
corporation’s activities.  This includes reporting on progress in improving 
environmental performance and engaging in adequate and timely communication and 
consultation with the communities directly affected by the environmental policies of 
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the investor and by their implementation.72  There is no clarification as to what 
adequate means in this context, but it may be similar to “meaningful” in the sense that 
the information is conveyed in a language that is understood and feedback provided 
by communities is not coerced.  Lastly the guidelines encourage multinationals “to 
contribute to the development of environmentally meaningful public policy by means 
of partnerships or initiatives that will enhance environmental awareness and 
protection.”73  This may contemplate an expanded form of public consultation. 
 Recommendations regarding disclosure focus on two areas: conventional 
reporting of the corporation’s financial statements and aspects of corporate 
governance, including such things as the remuneration of its officers; and secondly, 
fields in which reporting standards are still emerging, such as social and 
environmental risk reporting.   Corporations must be transparent in both of these and 
responsive to the public’s demand for information.74  The OECD encourages 
corporations to cooperate with NGOs and intergovernmental organizations to develop 
reporting standards that enhance the enterprise’s ability to communicate how their 
activities affect the environment.75 Adequate disclosure may also involve establishing 
availability of information in electronic or other non-printed format in recognition of 
the fact that many poorer communities may suffer environmental damage due to the 
corporation’s activities.76  The Guidelines state that disclosure requirements are not 
expected to place unreasonable administrative or cost burdens on enterprises, nor are 
they expected to disclose commercially sensitive information that might undermine 
their competitive position.77   
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This last statement is important in that onerous host state requirements in this 
regard could potentially amount to expropriation and entitle the corporation to 
compensation. Such was the nature of the claim made by the investor in Maffezini v 
Spain regarding mandatory environmental assessment procedures that involved public 
consultation, although it was rejected by the tribunal because of the clear requirement 
for such processes under the law of the host state.78  The allegation of onerous 
environmental assessment procedures was made recently by Clayton/Bilcon company 
against Canada and the province of Nova Scotia for its mandatory environmental 
impact assessment procedures for a quarry project.79 
 
VI.   United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (‘UNCITRAL’) 
UNCITRAL is a branch of the UN which was established in 1966 to promote the 
progressive harmonization and unification of international trade law.  It is most 
commonly associated with its system of arbitration rules.  UNCITRAL has also 
offered guidance with respect to environmental assessment that could well be applied 
to the investment context.  Its Legislative Guide on Privately Financed Infrastructure 
Projects80 is a document intended to encourage domestic legislators to consider 
environmental impacts when drafting laws governing private institutions that lend for 
the purposes of infrastructure projects.  These guidelines were adopted by 
UNCITRAL in June 2000 and are aimed at achieving a balance between facilitating 
private investment and addressing public interest concerns of the host country such as 
the environment.  The Guide suggests that when instigating requests for proposals for 
public infrastructure projects, project specifications must consider conformity with the 
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host state’s environmental regulations.81  The Guide also notes that international 
financial institutions are paying increasing attention to the environmental impact of 
projects and their long-term sustainability82 – meaning that if external funding in the 
way of loans is sought then environmental controls must be maintained to satisfy 
these creditors.  Environmental impact analysis is explicitly recommended as a means 
of ensuring the success of a privately funded project.83  The Guide notes that in some 
countries, public participation in the preliminary assessment of a project’s 
environmental impact has been ‘useful’ which appears to envision good business 
practice rather than a moralistic requirement of consent from those who may be 
harmed.84 Given that developing states are the target of foreign investment from the 
private sector this should be regarded as a highly important document and indeed a 
key feature of UNCITRAL’s work.   
 
 
7.  Environmental Protection in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and 
Regional Trade Agreements 
One of the most significant means by which environmental assessment involving 
mandatory of public input could be imposed upon foreign investment is through BITs.  
This is particularly the case where the multinational investor does not seek funding 
from a third party, such as the entities described above, or from private banks.  Sands 
cautions that while BITs increasingly reflect international environmental rules, they 
have also, perhaps unintentionally prompted many states to reduce their 
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environmental standards in order to attract foreign investment.85 There are now more 
than 2000 BITs aimed at increasing the flow of foreign direct investment between 
states by providing a stable, predictable legal regime and guarantees against 
expropriation.  A number of investment treaties recognize the rights of states to adopt 
certain measures designed to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to environmental concerns, but there is little evidence that these treaties 
actively require or even encourage environmental assessment of investment activities 
prior to their engagement, let alone public participation in this process.  Some of these 
treaties contain obligations relating to the observance of local environmental laws and 
investor liability for environmental transgressions that have already occurred – not 
details on potential environmental impacts of planned investment projects.    
  Chapter 19 of the Free Trade Agreement between Chile and the US86 outlines 
a general need to ensure environmental protection in conjunction with trade and 
investment activities, however there is no requirement of an environmental impact 
statement as a prelude to permitting entry or establishment of a foreign investment. 
The agreement does establish the Environmental Affairs Council between the state 
parties and is charged with seeking “appropriate activities” for public participation.87  
No further elaboration is provided regarding this concept although examples of 
cooperative activities to promote the development of environmental standards are 
listed and include: exchanging professionals, technicians, and specialists, study visits, 
organizing joint conferences, seminars, workshops, meetings, training sessions, and 
outreach and education programs.88  Parties are also required to respond favourably to 
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requests for consultations by persons or organizations in its territory.89  There is a 
further requirement for parties to take into account “public comments and 
recommendations regarding cooperative environmental activities.” Consultations 
between the parties themselves concerning environmental issues may be 
supplemented by advice or assistance from “any person or body” deemed appropriate 
to fully examine the issue.90  This may contemplate wider public participation but it 
appears to be restricted to situations in which a dispute has arisen between the parties, 
not a means of identifying environmental risks at an early stage of the investment 
project’s development.  
The North American Free Trade Agreement (‘NAFTA’)’s environmental side 
agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation91 is aimed 
at assessing the environmental impacts of cross border trade and investment and 
explicitly mentions the importance of public participation in its preamble as well as in 
its core objectives.92  The agreement contemplates public participation by providing 
private access to remedies for interested persons through the North American 
Commission for Environmental Cooperation, a body with a mandate to conduct 
ongoing ex post environmental assessment of NAFTA.93  The citizen complaint 
process enables citizens to trigger official investigations into a Member state’s failure 
to enforce its own environmental laws, a remarkable accomplishment in the field of 
citizen input in environmental compliance.  Unfortunately this process has been 
criticized for lacking effectiveness because of the inability of the Commission, upon 
receiving citizen complaints, to make binding legal determinations, in which case the 
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allegedly offending state can merely deny non-compliance to escape sanction.94 While 
this mechanism does establish a role for private citizens in the enforcement of 
environmental regulations, it does not constitute full citizen participation in as much 
as it does not permit those who may be affected by environmental harms to have their 
viewpoints heard by the relevant regulatory bodies before a project has begun.   
Article 17.4 of Central American Free Trade Agreement95 (‘CAFTA’) requires 
parties to encourage the establishment of voluntary guidelines for environmental 
performance and the sharing of information with the public for the purpose of 
environmental audits, reporting and monitoring.   Partnerships are encouraged 
between businesses, local communities, NGOs, governments and scientific agencies; 
however there is no mention of participation with citizen groups.  CAFTA also 
contains identical provisions to those seen in the US Chile BIT relating to the 
Environmental Affairs Council and its emphasis on public consultations.96  
The European Energy Charter97 (‘ECT’) contains extensive obligations 
relating to the protection of foreign investments and creates an obligation of 
minimizing environmental damage.98 Parties are required to promote the transparent 
assessment at an early stage and prior to decision, and subsequent monitoring, of 
Environmental Impacts of environmentally significant energy investment projects.99 
But discretion is granted to each party to decide the extent to which the assessment 
and monitoring of Environmental Impacts should be subject to legal requirements, the 
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authorities competent to take decisions in relation to such requirements, and the 
appropriate procedures to be followed 100  
The Australia – US Free Trade Agreement101, which will clearly have no 
impact on the developing world, makes provision for public participation as a feature 
of the enforcement of environmental laws that may be transgressed by investment 
projects.  Environmental laws must be transparent and publicly available.102 
Furthermore article 19.5.3 relating to dispute settlement states: “Each Party shall 
provide an opportunity for its public, which may include national advisory 
committees, to provide views, recommendations, or advice on matters related to the 
implementation of this Chapter, and shall make available such views, 
recommendations, or advice to the other Party and, as appropriate, to the public in 
accordance with its law.”   There is also provision for public consultation:  “Each 
Party shall take into account, as appropriate, public comments and recommendations 
it receives regarding these ongoing cooperative environmental activities.”103 While 
this is positive from a standpoint of requiring investors to engage stakeholder groups, 
again there is nothing on environmental assessment procedures to determine risks in 
advance of a project’s entrance or establishment in the host state.    
Finally, the Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable 
Development, created by the International Institute for Sustainable Development104, 
requires that investors comply with environmental assessment screening criteria and 
assessment processes applicable to their proposed investments as specified by the 
laws of the host state or the laws of the home state, whichever is the more rigorous.105  
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This requirement would appear to violate National Treatment obligations under 
Article 5 of the Agreement as it could subject foreign investments to more onerous 
environmental regulations (i.e. those of their home state) than that of domestic 
investors.  Still, the requisite environmental assessment is explicitly a pre-
establishment requirement, whereas the National Treatment obligation appears not to 
be engaged until the post-establishment phase in that it speaks of “management, 
conduct, operation and expansion” of the investment.  Under Article 12C of the 
Model Agreement, the environmental impact statement must be made public and 
accessible in the local community and to affected interests in the host state.  
Interestingly, 12D the Model Agreement also requires that investors and host state 
authorities apply the highly risk-averse Precautionary Principle to their environmental 
impact assessment.  This standard is very onerous from a compliance perspective and 
is not seen in any of the other guidelines examined. 
 It must be noted there are no provisions for mandatory environmental 
assessment as a pre-condition of investment establishment in the BITs of any of 
Brazil, Russia, India or China, the most advanced of the emerging economies.  This 
omission suggests that there is a significant potential for environmental hazards as a 
consequence of investment activities both in these states, or by multinationals from 
these states, when operating in regions with similarly weak regulatory regimes.    
 
 
8.   Achieving Environmental Impact Statements with Public Participation 
Through BITs 
Dolzer and Schreuer note that an extension of the conventional subject matter of BITs 
into spheres of environmental and social concern will be a necessary component of 
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future discussions into the usefulness of BITs as facilitators of investment flows.106 
The inclusion of mandatory public participation in environmental assessment into 
BITs may be the most effective means of screening projects for environmental risks, 
although precisely how this could be achieved is uncertain.   Public participation in 
environmental assessment of investment projects could be structured as a condition of 
entry into a host state and accordingly take the form of a simple pre-establishment 
requirement of the parties to a BIT as an obligation of both the home state of the 
investor and of the host state.  As such, in order for the requirement to be enforced 
against the investor, the host state could refuse entry to those investors that failed to 
engage in the proper consultative environmental assessments.  This should not 
transgress any National Treatment obligations, as this treatment is typically extended 
to the establishment phase of an investment only, although some treaties such as 
NAFTA extend National Treatment to the pre-establishment stage.   
It may also be possible to structure a BIT commitment to require the home 
state of the investor to ensure that its investors complied with the procedural 
requirements through the extra-territorial applicability of the home state’s own 
environmental laws.  It is widely assumed that there is a duty on the part of home 
states to ensure that its multinationals operate abroad in a manner that does not harm 
the environment of the host state.107 However, home-state based enforcement would 
necessitate that the home state have the legal capability to control the environmentally 
harmful extra-territorial activities of its corporate citizens.  This could be achieved 
through connections of nationality of the corporation in the home state, even if the 
acts themselves are done abroad with no effect at home.  A home state’s failure to do 
so could in turn result in allegations of breach of state responsibility under 
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international law.  However this doctrine is usually linked to actions of state organs, 
rather than private entities such as multinationals.108    
  Another means by which pre-establishment environmental assessment 
incorporating stakeholder participation could be ensured would be to structure this 
process as an aspect of regulatory transparency generally.  Environmental 
consultation processes could underlie transparency provisions within a BIT, or even 
as part of a more general instrument for international commercial activities, including 
investment as well as perhaps trade and competition.  Requirements of full 
transparency and disclosure in government regulation are a key feature of the World 
Trade Organization’s Agreement on Government Procurement as well as the Trade 
Related Aspect of Intellectual Property Agreement.  Such an approach is fitting 
because of the characterization of public consultations in environmental assessment as 
a process rather than as a substantive obligation with a specific content. 
 Lastly, a public participation requirement could be ensured through a BIT by a 
provision therein denying the foreign investor the right to bring a claim under the 
relevant treaty’s dispute settlement clause should the environmental assessment 
procedure be incomplete.  Thus an investor that failed to fulfil the proper 
environmental impact assessment as outlined in the treaty would be estopped from 
claiming, for example, breach of the BIT due to expropriation by the host state.  
Investors will therefore be compelled to engage in the necessary environmental 
impact procedures in order to retain the availability of dispute settlement.  With this 
method, participatory environmental assessment would not be a mandatory 
precondition of investor entry into the host state, but rather a means of accessing 
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certain additional advantageous features of the treaty arrangement.   There would be 
no pre-establishment National Treatment violation (such as the one contained in 
NAFTA) because domestic investors would not be able to use international arbitration 
to settle disputes with their own governments. 
 Mindful that home states may have little legal capacity or desire to control 
their corporations’ activities abroad (as may be the case with BRICs), host states that 
are at risk of ignoring environmental assessment processes in order to attract foreign 
direct investment could be compelled to insist upon these processes through a “Safe 
Haven”  type clause in the relevant BIT.  Such a clause would state that mandatory 
full environmental impact assessment process with stakeholder consultation would 
not amount to regulatory expropriation, provided that the requirement was not 
imposed in a discriminatory or arbitrary fashion.  As noted above there is a potential 
that an onerous assessment procedure could undermine the profitability of an 
enterprise, just as there is a potential that an investor could claim (illegitimately) that 
this process was unfair in order to ground a claim of expropriation.  By insulating the 
host state from this type of claim, host states would be more willing to require foreign 
investors to complete the environmental assessment process.  As BIT practice began 
to include such clauses, developing states would no longer need to compete with each 
other for the lowest environmental standards.  This could represent a potential 
solution to the three state problem discussed earlier. 
 It may be that the best way to ensure the participation of affected citizen 
groups in environmentally hazardous investment projects is to look beyond the sphere 
of international investment law as enshrined in various bilateral instruments and 
instead into the domain of human rights, such as those which are enforceable by 
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citizens through fora such as regional human rights tribunals.  A full discussion of this 
possibility is beyond the scope of this article.109 
 
  
9.  Conclusion 
Many foreign investment projects undertaken in the developing world raise serious 
environmental risks and the views of affected citizens should be sought as a 
component of environmental assessment before these investments are established and 
harm ensues.  This is particularly the case where investments originate from states 
that do not have an advanced tradition of environmental protection, such as the 
emerging economies. The investment credit agency policies discussed above show a 
positive tendency to require environmental assessment, often with public consultation, 
as a pre-condition of financing.  In order to properly scrutinize the environmental 
risks of foreign investment beyond financing stage, similar requirements must feature 
in BITs and cover the pre-establishment phase of an investment (before 
environmental hazards occur) not simply at the stage of dispute settlement.  Access to 
international dispute settlement and transparency requirements may permit the 
imposition of mandatory environmental assessment at the pre-establishment phase 
even where this might transgress a more broad National Treatment commitment.  
 The need for public participation in international investment law underpins the 
necessity of proceduralism in international law generally.  The participatory issues 
discussed herein could equally be applied to cultural, human rights or other public 
interest concerns that face citizens.  As Craik comments, “transnationalism” 
recognizes that there are limits to the capacity of the state to represent divergent 
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interests, accordingly many attempts to ensure appropriate representation of such 
interests will manifest themselves in rules of participation.110 While substantive 
environmental protections may never be achieved, as witnessed by the failures of the 
Kyoto Protocol and the recent impasse of the Cophenagen Conference, a process-
oriented approach may accomplish limited satisfaction among affected groups.  Still, 
as Richardson observes, consultation is different from consent,111 and any attempt to 
mandate the approval of citizens for investment projects, rather than merely 
disseminate information to them and receive their comments, will be a far more 
difficult endeavour.  While this might not achieve the ideal level of self-determination 
so vital to communities around the world, it should operate as a minimum form of 
environmental oversight that does not unduly threaten the liberalization of investment 
flows that is in the economic interests of all. 
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